Abstract: By analyzing state decision to give local authorities control over welfare policy, we seek to advance understandings of both the origins and the consequences of policy devolution. The first part of our analysis explores the political forces that systematically influence state decisions to cede policy control to lower-level jurisdictions. We propose a parsimonious Racial Classification model of how race influences social policy choice. Our findings strongly support this model as well as social control theory. Building on these results, we then show how modest but consistent racial effects on policy choices concatenate to produce large disparities in the overall policy regimes that racial groups encounter in the federal system. The empirical findings illuminate the fundamental role that federalism plays in the production of contemporary racial disparities and in the recent turn toward "neoliberal paternalism" in American poverty governance.
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For much of the twentieth century, intergovernmental relations in the United States followed a "cooperative" logic, with national government deeply involved in shaping and facilitating state and local action (Elazar 1984 (Elazar , 1992 . Since the 1970s, however, American federalism has undergone substantial change. National government has become more directive in mandating goals, enforcing standards, and preempting sub-national policies (Zimmerman 2001) . At the same time, it has ceded vast amounts of control over policy tools to lower jurisdictions (Donahue 1997) . In this latter development, the U.S. has followed a worldwide trend toward decentralized governance in an era of global market integration (Knox 1997) . The construction of this new "devolution settlement" has been a central theme in recent American political development and has played a key role in the restructuring of the U.S. welfare state (Peck 2003) .
Given this historical context, it is striking how little students of American politics know about the forces that shape decisions to devolve policy authority. Most political scholarship on devolution in the U.S. has focused on "first-order" transfers of control from the national to the state level (e.g. , Conlan 1998; Donahue 1997; Winston 2002) . Despite a large comparative literature on devolution (Cook and Manor 1998; Sinha 2005) , there have been few efforts to subject the U.S. case to a rigorous comparative historical analysis. Likewise, few have tried to gain analytic leverage on first-order devolution by comparing decisions across policy domains. As a result, scholars have been left with only historical narratives recounting how, by intention or default, control over policy tools has moved downward in particular policy areas. Today, students of American politics have far more to say about the consequences of devolution than about how, why, and when policy control gets devolved (cf. Peterson 1995) .
Under what conditions do higher levels of government become more likely to cede policy control to lower-level jurisdictions? By pursuing this question, we seek in this article to advance understandings of both the origins and the consequences of policy devolution. To gain some analytic leverage on the question, we take advantage of recent trends toward "second-order devolution" from state to local jurisdictions. In addition to being a major political development worth understanding in its own right (Gainesborough 2003) , second-order devolution offers a unique opportunity to study numerous transfers 2 of policy authority, all of which occur in the U.S. and each of which occurs under a different set of political, social, and economic conditions.
In the second half of our article, we turn from the question of origins to an analysis of consequences. Most of the existing literature in this area focuses on the potential for devolution to generate jurisdictional competition (Peterson 1995; Pierson 1995) or to encourage policy experimentation and learning (Berry and Berry 1999; Volden 2006) . These two images direct attention to different kinds of costs and benefits that may arise in the wake of devolution. The first suggests that by making inefficient public investments more costly, competition can improve the quality of governance. Yet competition may also lead states or localities to "race to the bottom," cutting regulations and social protections in an effort to preserve their tax base and avoid becoming a "magnet" for high-need social groups. The second image highlights the greater potentia l for jurisdictions to experiment, for the best ideas to diffuse to other locales, and for effective policy learning to take place. Yet it also suggests a potential downside to increasing differentiation: as states and localities experiment, residents in one area may be left with policies that are substantially inferior to what their fellow citizens enjoy elsewhere.
We focus on a third type of dynamic that may be set in motion by policy devolution. To the extent that policy choices are influenced by social-group composition, dispersed policy control may become an engine of social group inequalities (Lieberman 1998) . Indeed, if multiple policy choices are associated with group composition, small differences for each policy may concatenate to produce large disparities in the policy regimes encountered by group members. This dynamic, we suggest, offers insights into a troubling puzzle in contemporary American politics: In an era in which de jure racial distinctions are no longer tolerated and racial-egalitarian norms are widely embraced (Mendelberg 2001) , how do large racial disparities come to be produced and tolerated under the official sanction of government policy?
The policy at the heart of our analysis, welfare reform, offers more than just a fruitful case for studying general questions of federalism. It poses, in its own right, some crucial theoretical and substantive questions about the changing nature of the U.S. welfare state as well as the operation of race 3 and social control. Policy devolution under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program has coincided with a turn toward more directive, supervisory, and custodial approaches to handling the problems of the poor (Mead 1997; Western 2006) . Over the past few decades, poverty governance i n the U.S. has simultaneously become more muscular in its normative enforcement and dispersed in its organization.
In response, a number of scholars have argued that market globalization has been accompanied by a localization of the state's social control functions (Lowi 1998; Peck 2003) . Perhaps the most forceful and controversial framing of this thesis has been advanced by Loic Wacquant (2001 .
Wacquant argues that the United States has moved to a new "neoliberal paternalist" approach to managing marginality -an approach that deploys mass incarceration and restrictive welfare policy to manage social disorder among low-income African Americans. The new approach is "neoliberal" in its emphases on decentralization, privatization, performance management, and meeting the needs of global and local labor markets. It is "paternalist" in the sense that government adopts a more directive stance toward the poor and uses more intense forms of supervision, conditionality, and punishment to achieve desired behaviors. Wacquant argues that linked changes in welfare provision and incarceration have produced a coherent new regime of governance targeted at poor black communities.
For students of state politics, these arguments raise important questions about how second-order devolution intersects today with the politics of race and social control. Social control theorists have long emphasized that states employ both "beneficent" and "coercive" policy tools to maintain social order (Quinney 1974) . Welfare provision and incarceration, in this view, represent two sides of a single political dynamic, functioning as reinforcements or substitutes for each other (Fording 2001) . Recent research indicates that state usage of the two policy tools tracked closely with black insurgency and political power in the 1960s, in precisely the manner predicted by social control theory (Fording 2001) . Thus, to the extent that theorists such as Lowi (1998) and Wacquant (2005) are right that the U.S. is undergoing a localization of social control functions, we should expect state decisions to pursue second-order 4 devolution to coincide with stronger forms of welfare paternalism and carceral investment, as well as political factors traditionally emphasized by social control theorists (Piven and Cloward 1971; 1988) . This article offers the first empirical test of this thesis as it applies to state-level policymaking. In so doing, we devote special attention to the racial dimensions of the thesis. In the wake of welfare reform, students of state politics have produced a considerable amount of evidence that race has exerted a strong influence on state TANF choices (e.g., Soss et al. 2001; Fording 2003; Fellows and Rowe 2004) . In what follows, we extend this research to the topic of second-order devolution, but we also go beyond these earlier studies in two respects. First, we attempt to provide what earlier studies have not: an explicit decision model of how race influences state welfare policy choices. This simple model not only accounts for existin g findings in the literature, it also offers a novel prediction for our present analysis in which the effects of racial composition are mediated by patterns of racial dispersion. Second, we show how decisions to devolve authority to local jurisdictions combine with paternalist state policy choices to create distinctive TANF policy regimes. We conclude that the stringency of these regimes tracks closely with both state racial composition and state investments in incarceration.
State and Local Control: Recent History of the Welfare Case
When federal officials devolved key elements of TANF authority to the states in 1996, they extended a process that had been underway for some time (Conlan 1998; Osbourne 1988) . In the welfare arena, substantial first-order devolution began during the George H.W. Bush administration, when states were encouraged to apply for waivers under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program. States used their new leeway over the next decade to experiment with a variety of welfare innovations such as time limits, family caps, and "workfare." With the passage of federal reform in 1996, a number of key policy changes accelerated this trend sharply -most notably the shift from a matching grant to a block grant, increased state discretion in eligibility determination, and greater flexibility in the range of services states can provide to welfare recipients. Although federal officials set key welfare goals and set up a constraining system of incentives, states were encouraged to structure their TANF programs according to their own needs and priorities.
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In some states, but not others, lawmakers responded by deciding to transfer primary control of TANF policy tools from the state level to counties or other local governing bodies (Gainesborough 2003) .
Because decentralization has been widely seen as a defining feature of welfare reform, these developments have seemed natural and have drawn limited attention. Indeed, many observers predicted that second-order devolution would follow seamlessly and almost universally from the initial federal-tostate transfer of policy authority (Nathan and Gais 1999; Weir 1997; Whitaker and Time 2001) . Such predictions, however, tended to overlook significant countervailing pressures in the states. Over the lifespan of the AFDC program, the clear trend at the state level was toward centralization, with 17 states moving from an authority structure that emphasized local control to a structure with greater state supervision; no states moved in the opposite direction (Adkisson and Peach 2000) . During the TANF era, second-order devolution has turned out to be an important policy choice distinguishing state welfare regimes, not a natural or inevitable outgrowth of reform.
As of 2001, most states had either opted to forego second-order TANF devolution altogether or to pursue only a "slight" form of it (Gainsborough 2003) . By contrast, fourteen states reversed the trend under AFDC by pursuing "significant" devolution to local actors. In eight of these states, county officials gained control over welfare spending (through block grants) as well as authority over TANF work requirements, sanctions, time limits, and the use of one-time diversion payments (Gainsborough 2003) .
1
In six additional states, TANF authority was devolved to local/regional governing boards that now control funds and policies related to both welfare services and workforce development programs operating under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).
2 Such boards, which are mandated by WIA, consist of a mix of public and private officials. States rules for board composition vary, but in most states at least half the board's members must come from the local business community (Gainsborough 2003) .
Although only a minority of states has engaged in local devolution under the TANF program, the overall impact of this transfer is actually quite substantial because the fourteen states that have devolved authority include six of the eight most heavily populated states. 3 Advocates of devolution argue that these states have adopted a superior arrangement. In this view, local control allows for greater responsiveness 6 to citizens' policy preferences and more tailored approaches to the local problems poor people confront in different communities (Dye 1990; Rivlin 1992) . Critics, however, suggest that devolution might have more negative consequences for low-income families (Lowi 1998) .
Based on historical analysis, social control theorists argue that local policy authority "make[s] it possible to shape relief practices in accord with widely different labor practices… so as to mesh with local labor requirements" (Piven and Cloward 1993: 130-31) . Echoing this perspective, Gainesborough (2003: 618) suggests that the contemporary push for local control of the TANF program "represents a shift in emphasis away from the needs of the poor toward the needs of local employers." This concern is underscored by analyses suggesting that that local welfare control has often functioned to produce racial disparities, with the toughest rules implemented in areas with concentrations of people of color (Brown 1999; Lieberman 1998 ).
Studies of the AFDC and Food Stamp programs in the 1980s suggest that local control may indeed give rise to inequities in funding and service delivery (Grubb 1984; Peterson 1986 ) and that these tendencies can be curbed by the imposition of a more centralized system (Adkisson 1998) . To date, however, little is known about why some states have pursued devolution while others have not, and virtually nothing is known about how this decision intersects with other TANF policy choices to define distinctive state welfare regimes.
Deciding to Devolve: Theory and Hypotheses
The first stage of our analysis investigates the social, political, and economic factors that shape state decisions to devolve authority to county officials or local/regional governing boards. In specifying our models, we assume that such devolution may be pursued either as a way to achieve agreed-upon statewide policy goals or as a way to accommodate diversity in the policy goals and needs found in local jurisdictions. Moreover, we assume that decisions to devolve policy authority may be imposed from above by state officials or demanded from below by local policy actors. hence, need greater freedom to deploy policy tools in ways that differ from other local jurisdictions.
Whether they originate at the state level or are expressed as local demands, such perceptions should encourage devolution.
By contrast, where the minority percentage of the population is negligible, we should not find racial-dispersion effects because minorities will not be salient enough to serve as a primary basis for social classification of targets. As the prevalence of minority clients rises, racial dispersion should provide a more salient proxy for target differences. As a result, we arrive at the following interactive hypothesis.
In states where minority populations are less evenly distributed across counties, the probability of devolution will rise as the minority percent of a state's population increases. By contrast, when minority populations are more evenly distributed, the minority percent of a state's population will have significantly weaker effects. Finally, we can specify one other observable implication of the RC model. The underlying basis for the model's predictions is that the gap between group reputations conveys usable information about target differences. All else equal, larger gaps between reputations should convey more usable information 9 than smaller gaps. Thus, because stereotypes regarding work effort, motivation, and personal responsibility are considerably more negative for blacks than for Hispanics (Fox 2004), we should expect black-white contrasts to generate stronger cues regarding clientele differences than do Hispanic-whites contrasts. Accordingly, the RC model suggests we should expect the effects of racial dispersion and prevalence to be significantly stronger for blacks than for Hispanics.
Social Control. Social control theory offers a basis for four hypotheses regarding the politics of second-order devolution. Piven and Cloward (1993) argue that welfare programs function as mechanisms for the regulation of local labor markets and this function is enhanced when local policy control allows for the calibration of work enforcement to local labor market conditions. The need for such work regulation should be greatest when employers confront labor scarcity -either because unemployment is low in its own right or because welfare programs have removed significant numbers of potential workers from the labor pool. Based on this analysis, we hypothesize that transfers of TANF authority to the local level will be more likely in (a) states where employers feel stronger pressures generated by tighter labor supplies, as indicated by a lower unemployment rate in 1996, and (b) states with higher per capita welfare participation, as indicated by AFDC caseloads in 1996.
While the economic side of social control theory suggests that low-income groups have an interest in centralized policy control, the political side of this theory suggests that welfare arrangements will tend to be responsive to actual or potential lower-class political power (Piven and Cloward 1988; Fording 1997) . Following this logic, as well as recent supportive evidence (Avery and Peffley 2005), we advance a third hypothesis: second-order devolution will be less likely in states that exhibit a lower degree of class bias in voter turnout. Fourth, as described earlier, recent extensions of social control theory suggest that with the rise of global markets, states are undergoing an expansion of "institutions and methods of local social control" (Lowi 1998 ) in which paternalist welfare and mass incarceration produce integrated local systems "designed to manage the effects of neoliberal policies at the lower end of the social structure" (Wacquant 2001: 401) . These arguments converge on the prediction that, in states pursuing stronger approaches to the social control, we should see a combination of stringent paternalist welfare rules, devolution of welfare authority, and higher levels of state investment in carceral control.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that devolution will be more likely in states that spend a higher percentage of their direct expenditures on corrections. We turn t o the broader relationship between carceral investment and devolved paternalism in the second half of our paper.
Ideology and Innovative Problem-Solving. A third group of hypotheses emerge from the possibility that devolution has an ideological cast. In the U.S. context, devolution is often thought of as a conservative policy innovation (Conlan 1998 
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Task Environment. Finally, our last set of hypotheses concerns structural features of the environments in which state policymakers decide how to govern their TANF programs. All else equal, centralized governance should prove to be an easier task to the extent that residential populations are more concentrated geographically. Accordingly, we hypothesize that states with more dispersed populations (i.e., a lower population per square mile of land area) will be more likely to devolve authority to local counties or regional boards. As a second key feature of the task environment, we include a measure of per capita tax revenue in our model, with the expectation that it could relate to second-order devolution in one of two ways. On one side, a weak revenue base could provide incentives for state officials to send responsibility to the local level and limit expenditures through block grants. On the other side, a strong revenue base may promote the development of greater administrative capacity at both state and local levels. To the extent that this occurs, states with stronger revenue streams may find it easier to devolve to capable local organizations. Thus, we test a two-tailed hypothesis for per capita tax revenue.
Empirical Analysis of Second-Order Devolution
The far left column of Table 1 shows the results for a binary logit analysis of state choices to pursue second-order devolution. The overall results indicate that our hypotheses have significant explanatory power. Despite a small sample, 12 the joint effects of these variables easily achieve statistical significance (p < .001) and account for more than two-thirds of the variation across states. Turning to the coefficients, we find mixed results related to the image of second-order devolution as a conservative policy innovation. There is no evidence here that devolution decisions track with government ideology.
By contrast, devolution of TANF control has been significantly more likely in states with a history of early innovation under AFDC waivers.
[ Our four hypotheses derived from social control theory receive consistent support in this analysis.
States with higher welfare caseloads in 1996 were significantly more likely to devolve welfare authority to the local level in the ensuing years. Also consistent with the theory, states were significantly more likely to pursue second-order devolution if they had tighter labor markets. On the political side of social control theory, we find that second-order devolution is significantly more likely in states with a stronger upper-class bias in voter turnout. And consistent with neoliberal-paternalist extensions of the theory, we find that states higher levels of investment in corrections are significantly more likely to devolve control of TANF policy.
The results for our racial variables offer consistent support for the predictions of the RC model.
We find significant coefficients in the expected direction for the black percent of the state population, the variability of black populations across counties, and their interaction. To ease interpretation, Figure 1 offers a graphic portrait of these relationships. The three lines show how the predicted probability of devolution would change along with the black percent of population in a hypothetical "average" state (i.e., a state with average values on all other variables included in our model). When blacks are more evenly distributed (just one-half standard deviation below the mean), the black percent of the population has a negligible effect on the probability of devolution. When black residents are more unevenly distributed, however, raising the black percent of the population strongly increases the odds of devolution.
The effect is dramatic even at just an average level of black dispersion. It occurs even more sharply, and at a lower percent of the population, when black dispersion is set at one-half standard deviation above the mean.
[ Figure 1 ]
The remaining models in Table 1 replicate this analysis, first using measures of Hispanic prevalence and heterogeneity and then using measures of ideological prevalence and heterogeneity.
Consistent with the predictions of the RC model, the substitution of Hispanics for blacks weakens the 13 results substantially. The "Pseudo-R 2 " (PRE) drops precipitously, from .68 to .37, as one moves from the first model to the second. Moreover, we do not find significant coefficients for Hispanic prevalence, dispersion, or their interaction. The third model in Table 1 offers a similar story. Again, we find a much smaller PRE and weaker results for covariates in the model. We find no significant results for our measures of statewide support for Bush, the heterogeneity of support for Bush across counties, or their interaction.
13 Table 2 extends this analysis with three specification tests designed to check the robustness of results reported for our primary model in Table 1 . The first model here examines the possibility that second-order devolution is more likely when state officials have to manage demands from a larger number of lower-level jurisdictions. We find no significant effects associated with the number of counties in each state, and the addition of this variable produces no significant changes in our earlier results. The second model examines the possibility that devolution is a response, not to racial heterogeneity, but rather to policy-preference heterogeneity. This specification check extends our earlier test of ideological heterogeneity by searching for effects related to more policy-specific preferences. To measure this construct, we calculated the average coefficient of variation for state residents' preferences for spending on aid to the unemployed, the homeless, and blacks. We find no significant effects for this variable, and its addition to the model produces no discernible changes in our earlier results. Finally, the third specification check responds to a long history of southern distinctiveness in welfare provision, and particularly the possibility that findings related to race may only be capturing a "southern effect." Here again, the vast majority of the findings remain unchanged; the results related to the RC model prove robust; and the new variable produces a statistically insignificant coefficient.
[Table 2]
In sum, we find strong evidence in support of the hypotheses derived from social control theory and the RC model. The predicted heterogeneity effects appear only for African Americans. They do not appear for Hispanics, for political ideology, or for policy preferences. Moreover, three relevant specification checks have no discernible effects on our major results.
Cumulative Effects of Policy Choice
"The key to successful social policy for African Americans has historically been national policies that have been able to overcome the native parochialism of American state institutions…. The distinction between national and local control and the extent of decentralized bureaucratic discretion have been crucial in determining how social policy treats African Americans." - Robert Lieberman 1998: 228-29 The relationship between race and social provision has, for most of U.S. history, been a welltraveled two-way street. Among political scientists, Robert Lieberman (1998; and Ira Katznelson Policies, of course, are government outputs, but they are outputs with the power to shape civic status and define the positions that social groups occupy in relation to the state (Mettler and Soss 2004) .
If states with greater numbers of black residents choose distinctive TANF program rules, the combined (if unintended) effect may be to create an overall system in which African Americans participate in distinctive institutions. Indeed, if multiple policies follow this racialized pattern, small but consistent differences may combine to produce dramatic racial disparities -leaving African Americans exposed to tougher rules implemented with more local discretion. racial gaps ranging from 7 to 13 points.
[ Figure 2 ]
In Figure 3 , we extend this analysis to the question of how racialized state policy choices concatenate to produce distinctive welfare policy regimes. The horizontal axis here indicates how many of the four relevant TANF policies a given state employs: 7 have none; 13 have just one; 15 have two; 7 have three; and 4 states employ all four program elements. The left side of the figure presents a policyregime version of our state caseload analysis -i.e., the average percent black and percent white in states with each regime type. Here, we see that modest but consistent differences in separate policy choices combine to produce an intensely racialized pattern of policy regimes. White families average 69 percent of the caseload in states that employ none of these restrictive rules, while black families account for only 13 percent of the rolls. As one moves to the right, toward the most stringent regimes, the white percent falls as the black percent rises. In the regimes that combine the most restrictive rules with local program authority, whites average only 32 percent of the caseload while blacks average 60 percent.
[ With this evidence in hand, we return to the broader questions of race, welfare, and carceral control raised by the neoliberal-paternalist thesis (Wacquant 2001; Lowi 1998) . The thesis suggests that tougher forms of locally controlled welfare paternalism should occur alongside stronger investments in incarceration and that the strength of this overall policy formation should track with the prevalence of African Americans across political jurisdictions. (The pattern of bars here offers additional corroboration of the relationship between percent black and "neoliberal paternalism" in the TANF program shown in Figure 3 .) The dots plotted in this figure show how the average level of state corrections spending (measured as a percent of total direct expenditures) changes as TANF regime stringency increases. They appear to track closely with both the black percent of state population and TANF regime stringency. This apparent relationship is confirmed by the curved line in the figure -a simple quadratic slope generated by predicting corrections spending using only TANF regime stringency and its square. The relationship between average state corrections spending and TANF regime stringency is very strong: the R-squared for this simple quadratic slope is .83.
[ Figure 4 ]
Taken together, the results in this figure suggest a strong state-level pattern of "racialized neoliberal paternalism." Looking across the U.S. states, one finds a tightly configured relationship consisting of rising black population rates, more stringent and locally controlled TANF regimes, and higher levels of investment in carceral control.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
By analyzing state policy choices under welfare reform, we have sought in this paper to shed new light on both the origins and consequences of social policy devolution. We have asked why some states devolve TANF authority to local jurisdictions while others do not, and we have asked how this policy choice intersects with others to produce disparities in the TANF regimes encountered by different racial groups. These questions strike as crucial for understanding both the general operation of federal political systems and the particular course of recent changes under welfare reform. Reviewing the findings just presented, however, we are perhaps most impressed by the need to locate contemporary welfare developments as a moment within the longer historical interplay of localism, race, and welfare provision in the United States.
Mothers' Pensions, the precursor to the AFDC and TANF programs, developed in the states in the early twentieth century. Local control was a key feature of these pensions and was used both openly and covertly to focus aid on white mothers and immigrants deemed capable of assimilation (Reese 2005) .
"Groups today regarded as minorities received only a tiny proportion of mothers' aid. … Sometimes minorities were excluded from programs; at other times programs were not established in locations with large minority populations" (Gordon 1994: 48) .
When the federal government created a national system of social insurance in 1935, southern interests worked to protect the racially exploitative sharecropping system from the threat of federally controlled public aid (Lieberman 1998) . In the decades that followed, state administrators offered black families only limited access to relief, calibrated to local planting and harvesting seasons; state lawmakers shored up these local practices by creating program rules that could be used to purge recipients "in areas where seasonal employment was almost exclusively performed by nonwhite families" (Bell 1965: 46; Piven and Cloward 1993: 134) .
In the 1960s, these tendencies toward localism were significantly reversed. African Americans gained access to the vote, became more central to the Democratic Party coalition, and pursued confrontational, disruptive political tactics designed to secure more equal access to societal and governmental goods. These developments combined with (and propelled) major policy initiatives by elite reformers in government. The result was a large expansion of the federal role in welfare provision. Waron-Poverty programs intervened directly in social and economic relations at the local level, often producing tremendous racial conflict in the process (Quadagno 1994) . Across the states, welfare expansion was the order of the day, and it tracked closely with patterns of black insurgency, black electoral power, and changes in incarceration rates (Fording 1997; . In the years that followed these developments, the AFDC program was characterized by significant centralizing dynamics -not only in the form of substantial national involvement but also in the form of local responsibilities moving upward to the state level (Adkisson and Peach 2000) .
The most recent "devolution revolution" in American welfare provision represents a sharp reversal of this system of poverty governance -a return to the lower-level control that has characterized support for low-income families for most of U.S. history. In the context of civil rights and far more egalitarian norms, it is unimaginable that local welfare control could operate today in the overtly racialist forms that prevailed in the first half of the twentieth century. Yet the findings presented in this article suggest some troubling historical continuities in the political dynamics that surround state welfare programs. Now as in the past, the politics of local welfare control remains rooted in race, labor markets, electoral mobilization, and a system of state social control that links welfare provision and incarceration.
Against this historical backdrop, we believe this article makes three important contributions to current scholarship on race, federalism, and welfare.
First, as just noted, welfare provision today takes place in a societal context that is far removed from the era of Jim Crow and southern racial caste. Civil rights are now in place; norms of racial equality are widely embraced; and racial prejudice has been in slow decline for decades (Mendelberg 2001) . How, then, do significant racial disparities get created and perpetuated under the aegis of government policy?
We suggest that at least part of the answer to this question lies with federalism and the potential for policy choices to track the distribution of social groups across political jurisdictions.
Students of education policy have been familiar with this logic for some time: de jure equality can easily co-exist with large de facto inequalities if members of social groups reside in separate jurisdictions with unequal resource bases and independent policies (Hochschild and Scovronick 2004) .
Our analysis suggests that this may be a general policy dynamic and that it may operate across policy choices in a cumulative fashion. Black and white TANF recipients are indeed equal before the law. But they are distributed unequally across the states; their presence influences state policy choices; and consistent effects on these choices accumulate to produce dramatic inequalities in the policy regimes under which black and white recipients participate.
Second, our analysis makes both a conceptual and an empirical contribution to the thesis of neoliberal paternalism. Wacquant's (2001; account is based on a broad interpretive reading of evidence concerning recent developments in American society and public policy. In this account, incarceration and welfare paternalism work together as a system of racialized social control. As political scientists, what we find most lacking in Wacquant's sociological account is a conception of how state structures matter and how political choice processes operate to produce the policies he examines. For Wacquant, racial regulation under neoliberal paternalism is a defining national feature of contemporary American society. At an empirical level, this article offers some of the strongest evidence to date that a logic of "racialized neoliberal paternalism" may be at work in the contemporary United States. At a conceptual l evel, however, this analysis underscores that a federal structure of independent political jurisdictions is central to both the operation and the racialization of this system.
Third and finally, we have sought to advance the study of race and state policy choice by presenting a parsimonious general model based on the logic of racial classification. The RC model provides the field with a testable set of propositions regarding when and how we should expect the race of target groups to influence state policymaking. Without making any attribution of racial affect or racist intent, it predicts that the extent of racial effects on state policy choice should covary systematically with 20 (a) the salience of race within a particular policy domain, (b) the prevalence and distribution of racial groups within a policy's target population, (c) the fit between a particular policy choice and specific elements of group reputation, and (d) the size of the gap between racial groups' policy-relevant reputations.
The RC model is well grounded in social cognition research and consistent with previous findings regarding race and welfare policy choices in the states. It generates distinctive predictions regarding the effects of racial heterogeneity on state devolution decisions, and these predictions are corroborated. It also offers an explicit basis for expecting racial/ethnic effects to operate differently across groups with different policy-relevant reputations, and this prediction is confirmed. Indeed, the evidence for distinctive racial effects focused on African-American policy targets has been quite striking.
It would be a mistake, to our minds at least, to read the RC model or our associated findings as suggesting that there is something inherently inegalitarian or racialized about "devolution in general."
Devolution settlements, as Peck (2003) nicely describes them, can take many different forms. If structured appropriately, enhancements of local control can empower disadvantaged citizens to participate directly in the public policies that affect their lives (Fung 2004 ) and can enable some local jurisdictions to pursue more egalitarian policy agendas (Rogers 2004) . Moreover, our findings do not contradict conventional claims on behalf of lower-level policy control: in some circumstances, devolution really may be able to generate gains in government efficiency (Peterson 1995) , opportunities for experimentation and learning (Volden 2006) , and possibilities for more tailored, locally-attuned policy solutions (Fung 2004) .
Devolution is an open-ended form of political action with the potential to set a variety of different political dynamics in motion. Under welfare reform today, however, our evidence suggests that these political dynamics have a great deal to do with race and social control. There is, in a sense, a color to welfare devolution. In the wake of federal welfare reform, racial differences have shaped policy choices, and policy choices, in turn, have shaped racial differences. First-order devolution to the states has facilitated the construction of different welfare regimes for different racial groups. Second-order 21 devolution to local authorities has proceeded along racial lines -in ways that intersect with the racialized patterning of paternalist welfare rules and custodial criminal justice investments. Thus, while "devolution in general" may have open-ended political implications, devolution of welfare control seems to be a different story. Over the past century, welfare localism has consistently facilitated racialized practices of social control. Today, devolution is emerging as a central feature of a new, more muscular approach to poverty governance in the United States. And unfortunately, it appears that it has not lost its color. 
